Scramble Seawolves!
Tom Phillips,
Seawolf 98
Reprinted with permission
This
is the story of a minor combat engagement at an outpost in South
Vietnam called Hoa Binh. It is representative of Seawolf combat
operations during the withdrawal of U.S. riverine forces and the
turnover of naval operations to the South Vietnamese in 1971.
HA(L)-3, the only Navy attack helicopter squadron in Vietnam,
was a unique concept designed to support the Navy riverine forces
operating in the Mekong Delta area of South Vietnam. The squadron
was a child of the Vietnam war, being commissioned, operated,
and finally decommissioned entirely within the Delta of South
Vietnam.
MACV Concept of Ops for the Mekong Delta
The Mekong Delta was part of the military area called IV (pronounced
"four") Corps by the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
(MACV). It was at the south end of the country, the opposite end
from the more well-known I (pronounced "eye") Corps
area along the DMZ. The Mekong Delta, one of the largest and most
fertile river delta systems in the world, is at sea level, is
predominantly flat, and consists mostly of flooded land, largely
under cultivation to produce rice, lots and lots of rice. But
a significant percentage of the Delta is also in a wild state.
The wild areas are split between reed and grasslands, scrub swamps,
and forbidding triple canopy mangrove swamps. In the dry seasons,
the grasslands and some of the rice paddies are dry. During the
two yearly monsoons, virtually everything is inundated. Almost
all business commerce and travel is conducted on a complex and
well-developed system of canals, rivers, creeks, and lesser tributaries
which criss-crosses the Delta as thoroughly as the street network
of any major city.
The Mekong and the Bassac Rivers, two of the great rivers of
the world, run out of Cambodia parallel to each other, cross the
center of the Delta and split into numerous large river mouths
as they near the sea. They combine with the major canals to form
the primary byways of the area. Some of the more important canals
were major projects of an awesome scale, built by the French during
the colonial period. Only a few dependable roads exist. They are
usually along the large flood control dikes which line the rivers,
and the larger canals. The few other roads are strictly seasonal.
Accepted Army counterinsurgency doctrine, adopted by MACV, featured
three steps; step 1 - control and protection of the population
areas from the insurgents, step 2 - aggressive patrolling to restrict
enemy movement and keep the initiative, and step 3 - sweeps of
suspected enemy base areas to deny the enemy any sanctuaries.
In short, this doctrine means occupation and presence, developing
a base from which to project power to wipe out the insurgency.
While historians will argue the validity and effectiveness of
this doctrine in I Corps and the central highlands of Vietnam,
there is little question that this doctrine was successful in
the Delta. But in the Delta, occupation of the "land"
and control called for by the doctrine did not fit the Army organization
and equipment. The problem was the Mekong Delta, there wasn't
enough dry land for the doctrine to be effective using traditional
Army equipment, methods, and procedures. Conventional Army land
mobility did not exist. All traffic would either be waterborne
or airborne. It was a unique area for combat unlike any the Army
had ever encountered before, calling for original solutions.
Perhaps this uniqueness itself was the reason for U.S. success
in the Delta. Conventional methods of doctrine implementation
were clearly inappropriate and operations were designed beginning
with a clean slate rather than being encumbered with the "baggage"
of preconceived plans and opinion.
Clearly, the good guys were as dependent on the use of the waterway
network as were the local population and the enemy themselves.
The entire concept of operations in the Delta was tied to control
of the waterways. For that, the Army needed the Navy. The Navy
responded by taking a page from its own history, updating the
successful riverine warfare coordinated operations of the Civil
War (also known in some regions of the U.S. as the War of Northern
Aggression).
An entire "brown water" Navy was created to support
Army troop movement, and to implement the patrolling part of the
counterinsurgency doctrine. Major lift of large Army units was
accomplished by Navy riverine force transports, augmented by Army
helicopter transport lift. The transport force was protected by
the riverine force "battleships", monitors carrying
large caliber (40-mm) guns in armored "turrets", "Zippo's",
monitors with flame thrower turrets, and PBR's, the ubiquitous
river patrol boats - "destroyers" of the river force.
These "brown water warships" were usually modifications
of amphibious landing craft, LCM's, and included interesting prototype
ideas as well; water cannon turrets, air cushion vehicles, predecessors
to today's LCAC. These big sweeps were carefully planned and could
lay on artillery and air support in large quantities because of
the set-piece nature of such a carefully "staffed" operation.
Such an operation was the speciality of the Army chain of command
and the staff college graduates running the show.
By 1971, there were not many of these big sweeps happening in
IV Corps. The war in the Delta had settled down into a relatively
stable equilibrium. The VC owned certain areas and the good guys
owned the rest. The few VC strongholds in 1971 were really strong.
Nothing short of a really major action was going to dislodge them
from the mangrove swamps they still held. But the VC in the Delta
were not able to be a real threat to the government as long as
they remained in their swamps. Apparently that was fine with MACV.
All the productive portions of the Delta were under reasonable
control. Politically, the U.S. had decided to withdraw from the
quagmire, and U.S. forces were leaving and turning over their
successful Delta operations to the South Vietnamese. Counterinsurgency
doctrine was reduced to the first two steps, control of the population
areas, monitoring all traffic, and aggressive patrolling to complicate
or interdict enemy movements. As long as aggressive patrolling
and a strong network of Ruff Puff outposts was sustained, neutralizing
VC influence in the Delta, there was no immediate need for sweeps
into the VC strongholds called for by doctrine. During the turnover,
dwindling U.S. forces remained there to man the ramparts and bolster
the local forces.
The local militia, called Regional Forces and Popular Forces,
and called Ruff Puffs by the Americans, were stationed so as to
monitor traffic in the populated areas, and were also stationed
in remote areas at key travel junctions and likely infiltration
routes. From these bases they were to check papers, and patrol
locally to monitor activity. They usually confined this activity
to daylight hours. The VC owned the dark as far as the Ruff Puffs
were concerned and night patrols were not the domain of a family
man. Nobody really expected the Ruff Puffs to aggressively confront
the VC by themselves. Serious patrolling was left to the VN Army
regulars, the U.S. Army, and the Navy.
Because we owned the air, major enemy movement was conducted at
night. And, because we owned the air, the only way for the enemy
to get around was on the waterway system. Therefore, the key to
patrolling was in patrolling the waterways....at night.
Friendly air support for the Navy patrolling program required
night flight operations and quick reaction. Neither were strong
points of Army aviation in the 1960's and 70's. Army helicopter
aviation of that era, was not generally able to operate at night
effectively. (Not very many Army pilots were instrument rated.
Only a few units had the capability, and they were centrally located
and controlled, too far from the fight to respond in the time
required to make a difference).
Quick reaction was difficult for the Army, which preferred to
operate from large central bases, such as Long Binh, Dong Tam,
Can Tho, and a few others. To enable Army aviation to cover the
remote parts of the Delta removed from the main bases, they established
outlying airstrips, guarded by Ruff Puffs, which provided fuel
and ammunition, for the centrally-based helicopters. The Army
air support allocation system was fine for the larger scale, scheduled
events typical of Army operations, but did not adequately support
the aggressive and frequent patrolling which was the key to executing
the concept of operations dictated by the terrain of the Delta.
Patrolling generated contact with the enemy. Contact resulted
in combat. Short and fierce fire fights requiring immediate friendly
air support.
Another problem directly related to the quick reaction issue
was the question of command and control of patrolling forces.
The Army was uncomfortable with operating their attack helicopters
in areas containing friendly civilians and friendly forces without
the aid of qualified forward air controllers (FACs) to take responsibility,
to control the strikes, and coordinate with ground forces. Add
to the problem a complicating factor that the "ground"
forces were Navy. Army FACs were scarce. The Army was not willing
to expend limited FAC assets maintaining an alert posture or conducting
continuous patrols in order to be on station when needed.
The need was for a steady supply of instrument qualified pilots
who could operate autonomously from major bases, be able to work
closely with the riverine forces, and who we schooled to exercise
command judgement at the lowest tactical level. It was desirable
that they be able to work without the requirement for forward
air controllers. The solution resided in the Navy itself.
To solve these problems, in 1967 the Navy commissioned HA(L)-3,
the Seawolves, flying the UH-1, and VA(L)-4, the Black Ponies,
flying the OV-10, to take up the mission the Army was unable or
unwilling to do. The Seawolves would be stationed and operate
at remote sites and at night.
The Black Ponies, limited to runways, would operate from a central
base, similar to the Army, but would bring to the problem a much
faster aircraft and the ability to be dedicated to riverine support
from an alert status. They could get to the far reaches of the
Delta three times as fast as Army helicopters and almost as fast
as the local Seawolves. When they arrived, they brought with them
welcomed firepower in the form of 5-inch Zuni rockets and twenty-millimetre
guns that was unmatched by any Army aviation we ever saw in the
Delta. Heavy artillery for the really big jobs in our little war.
They were far more effective than any Air Force or carrier bombers
(not that we ever saw any) because of the Black Ponies well-respected
pinpoint close air support. They knew the boats, and the Seawolves.
We complemented each other nicely. Throughout the Delta, Seawolves
and Black Ponies were considered by all commanders to be their
own FACs, an acknowledged and approved exception to MACV policy
existing at the time, which required FACs to control and direct
"gunships".
By 1971, the Seawolves, Black Ponies, and SEALS were the last
remaining Navy combat forces in the Delta. They held the line
while U.S. forces withdrew from the Delta.
HA(L)-3 Concept of Ops
The
concept of ops for the Seawolves was simple. Establish several
two-helo detachments and "permanently" locate them as
close to the operating areas of the Navy riverine forces to be
supported as conditions would allow. The det would be on continuous
alert, and be able to respond to a call for help within minutes.
By being located in the operating area, it would be able to be
on station within just a few minutes of a scramble. It could navigate
to the area expeditiously because it would be flying over as area
that it patrolled constantly and knew intimately. Upon arrival
at the scene of action, it would be able to effectively coordinate
with the Navy units in contact because they operated together
routinely, probably operated from the same or a neighbouring support
base, and knew each other well.
Seawolf Detachment Organization
The det consisted of eight pilots, and eight aircrew-gunners
who were also the mechs for the two UH-1B helicopters. Later in
the war the UH-1B began to be replaced by later model H-1's which
had more powerful engines and more efficient rotor systems, the
UH-1M. For some obscure reason, the Army provided HA(L)-3 with
its helicopters, probably out of guilt, because the Seawolves
were doing a mission they could not seem to satisfactorily perform
themselves. But there wasn't THAT much guilt; they were the oldest
helicopters in-country. We didn't see anything newer than the
H-1 BRAVO until all Army units were flying D and H models or better,
and the last B models had been attritioned out. Actually, the
Army provided the helicopters from their largess because there
weren't 30 spare helicopters available in the entire Navy which
could be operated as helicopter gunships. 30 Army helicopters
was a drop in the bucket and they would do almost anything to
stop the Navy criticism of their lack of responsiveness to Navy
close air support needs in the Delta.
The det had an O-in-C, usually a Commander or Lieutenant Commander,
an assistant O-in-C, usually a Lieutenant, and six JayGees. Between
the six jaygees, they held down the admin officer and maintenance
officer jobs. No other REAL jobs and no make-work B.S. jobs. Virtually
NO paperwork! Reasonable.
Operationally, the officers were qualified as Fire Team Leaders
(FTLs), Attack Helicopter Aircraft Commanders (AHACs), lead ship
copilot, and trail ship copilot. The FTL position was earned after
enough time in country to become an AHAC (100 hours combat mission
time, AND 500 hours total) plus another 100 combat mission hours
as an AHAC. No exceptions. This meant that fire teams could be
led by JayGees with Commanders for copilots. In fact, it was normal
until the "newbie O-in-C" got his time. If, for some
reason there was only one FTL, the det ran only one fire team
until someone else got his time, or until the squadron moved another
FTL to the det. No compromises of quality for the sake of "giving"
a qual or filling a slot.
The basic combat unit was the fire team. Only in an extreme
emergency would the det fly a single aircraft in combat. The FTL
ran the mission. The lead ship copilot, the most experienced of
the two non-HAC pilots (required hours not defined), was responsible
for fire team navigation and determining the position coordinates
for target or landmarks. The trail aircraft of the fire team,
flown by the non-FTL AHAC, was responsible for covering the FTL
in a fire fight. The trail copilot was in the learning seat. He
practiced nav towards promotion to the lead ship, and worked the
pylon mini-gun and the M-79. He had been trained by the Army in
the UH-1 on the weapon systems we used. It was thorough basic
stateside training. All he needed was to learn the lessons of
combat that modified the stateside training to a more usable product.
Two crews stood the alert for a 24 hour period taking all calls
and patrols during that time. Then the other two crews stood their
24 hours. If the action was heavy enough during a given duty period,
the O-in-C would rotate crews early to keep up fighting efficiency
and provide a margin of safety. The crews alternated for the entire
tour. There were no holidays, no safety stand downs, no days off
for the det. We flew patrols on the formal cease-fire days, such
as the Tet New Year and Christmas. Saw action on those days too.
It was a cease-fire in Saigon. Not in the boonies.
Seawolf Helicopter Armament
The aircraft were armed with two forward firing seven-shot 2.75-inch
rocket pods fired by the pilot in the right seat. Rockets had
a variety of warheads. There was smoke, of various decorator primary
colors, which we didn't use much, since it would not likely hurt
anybody. White phosphorous, called "willy peter", which
we DID use whenever we thought a smoke would be needed because
it WOULD hurt somebody. It burned through anything and couldn't
be put out easily.
The most common warhead was high explosives fragmentation, or
HE, standard ten-pound warhead and the heavier seventeen-pound
warhead. We usually used the ten pounders because the rocket's
ballistics was more predictable with the lighter payload. We didn't
mix them because of the different ballistics. It was hard enough
to reliably hit the target with rockets without adding to the
problem by mixing warheads. The 2.75-inch rocket motor burned
out long before the rocket got to the impact area, and it then
flew a much more imprecise ballistic non-powered path the rest
of the way. It also weathervaned into the relative wind. Throw
the ball out a little and you could shoot the suckers around corners.
Change pitch and they went up or down. You could clear your own
LZ by firing them in an autorotation, and could send them into
the next county by firing with topping pitch pulled.
Finally there was the fleshette warhead, popularly known as "nails".
It sent a pattern of 2400 little one-and-a-half inch darts which
could cover a football field with one dart in each square foot
when fired from the proper altitude. We loved them, but didn't
load them often because you couldn't use them anywhere near close
enough to do effective close air support. If we didn't have a
specific mission coming, and were on alert, we might load a couple
of nails to be fired first. Then if the situation was wrong when
we got to the scene, we would first "waste" them into
a clear area and then get on with the business at hand with the
remaining rockets. It was worth the waste because they were simply
devastating if you found the right target. They could penetrate
ten feet of water with killing force.
There were point detonating fuses and proximity fuses. We took
the prox whenever we could get them, because the water and mud
would absorb most of the explosive effect of a point det warhead
and vent the rest more or less straight up. You had to hit in
a tree or hard ground to get a good frag pattern and effective
kill radius. You had to be careful with the prox fuses though.
If you fired one with a prox fuse too soon after firing a preceding
one, it might detonate on the wake of the earlier rocket; a jarring
surprise for the unwary shooter. Because we often needed to get
rockets away quickly, we would alternate prox with point detonating
fuses so two rockets could be fired in quick succession. If the
expected target area was wooded extensively, we would select the
point det to get better penetration into the forest canopy before
the fuse hit something and set off the warhead.
By 1970, the aircraft also featured a 7.62 caliber six-barrelled
Gatlin gun, colloquially called a mini-gun, mounted on a remote
pylon on the left side of the helicopter. It was controlled by
the left seat pilot. It had an arc of fire from a few degrees
above the horizontal axis of the helo (mechanically stopped below
the rotor arc, of course), to 80 degrees down, and from ahead
out to the left another 80 degrees. It fired four thousand rounds
per minute. The ammunition load was usually about 1500 rounds
loaded in a feeder tray inside the cabin. It was a very finicky
system and tended to jam unless the copilot was very careful with
how he treated it. No sudden movements of the train control, and
no short bursts of fire. You had to let it go for the three second
burst which was automatically terminated by a cutoff switch in
the gun controls. Then the system would usually perform without
jamming. That was a plenty long burst and very colorful at night
since every fourth round was a tracer, fifty of the little darlings
per three-second burst (and another one hundred fifty invisible
ones). Because of all the slightly sloppy linkage of this remote-controlled
gun system, the natural dispersion of this gatlin gun generally
restricted its use if the enemy was too near friendlies.
The best weapons capability rested in the two door gunners. The
left door gunner usually manned a 7.62 caliber M-60 machine gun,
chopped down from the ground-pounder version by removing the forward
stock and bipod, and the rear stock. It was fired using the pistol
grip trigger. It had a second dummy pistol grip fixed to the barrel
forward of the one with the trigger, and 90 degrees to it as a
second handle. This allowed the gun to be handled by the gunner
without the requirement to be fixed to the mount. The gun was
mounted on a swivel mount, but could be, and usually was, detached
from the swivel during a hot fight, and "free gunned".
When free-gunning, the gunner could sweep the gun through a much
wider field of fire. He could actually step down on to the skid,
lean down and fire the gun behind and under the helicopter at
targets even beyond dead astern the aircraft. The gunner rested
the butt of the gun on top of his shoulder, rather than into it,
absorbing the recoil with his arms, allowing the gun to be much
more effectively held on target. The left gunner usually carried
about 1000 rounds of ammo. He had a large ammunition box with
all the ammo linked in one continuous belt. The box was about
a foot high and also acted as his seat. The ammo fed up between
his legs to the gun.
The right gunner operated one of two guns depending on the configuration
of the aircraft, either a fifty caliber heavy machine gun, or
a door mounted mini-gun. He also had a backup M-60 in case his
primary weapon malfunctioned at a critical moment. The mini-gun
had the same basic characteristics as the flex pylon mounted one
on the left side. Being mounted in the door, the gun was considered
more valuable than mounted on the right pylon where it had once
been. Because it was aimed by the hand of the gunner, it did not
need the flex mount motors for training, thus eliminating a great
deal of the sloppy linkage. For this reason it was more "precise"
than the pylon version, and the gunner had better control of the
pattern of rounds. Also for this reason, it did not break down
as often, there were fewer moving parts and subsystems. But it
still broke down more often than the older, simpler, guns. When
it inevitably did, the gunner could access the gun to repair jams
and other malfunctions. The right door mini-gun usually carried
about 1500 rounds of ammo.
Because of the tendency of the mini-gun to malfunction, the
other helicopter in the typical det was usually outfitted with
a fifty caliber heavy machine gun, a more reliable gun with a
longer accurate range, and good penetrating power because of the
larger bullet. It was able to fire armor piercing and incendiary
tracer rounds as well. The other guns had only ball and tracer
ammunition. Some dets were able to scrounge the aviation version
of the fifty. It had a shorter barrel, and fired 900 rounds per
minute as opposed to the 600 rounds per minute for the regular
ground fifty. The only problem with the fifty was the number of
dud rounds we sometimes encountered. Some of the ammo boxes were
packed during World War II. The helo carried about 1000 rounds
of fifty ammo.
The aggregate of all the ammo, about 5000 rounds sounds impressive
but it amounted to about two minutes of continuous fire in a hot
fire fight. The reason I say that the gunners were our best weapons
capability, was because of the amazing accuracy our extremely
well-trained, and proficient gunners could achieve with their
hand-held weapons. They fired their basic load of ammunition at
least every other day, either for real, or on training proficiency
shoots at the end of an uneventful patrol. A THOUSAND rounds minimum,
EVERY OTHER DAY!! Per MAN!! I have to laugh at the 300 rounds
per DET per QUARTER allocation for today’s squadrons and
dets being sent in harm's way. Somebody is going to get harmed
all right, but it may not be the intended somebody.
Much of the fire from the helo was directed to the close proximity
of friendly units. Real close. Because of that requirement, the
gunners knew that the first rounds had to be on target. That took
some real marksmanship. Anybody who can water his lawn, can eventually
get rounds on target with a machine gun that is firing tracers
from an air platform. In the meantime, rounds are falling where
they may not be welcomed by friendly forces. To keep up the skill
to put the first rounds in the intended place, the gunners would
sometimes shoot seagulls out of the air. The understood rule was
that they had to have hit the bird by the fourth tracer, or let
it go. That is a 1.5 second burst of sixteen rounds. Very good
shooting when you can do it. Most of them could. Tough on the
occasional seagull, but really tough on the VC and NVA.
Personal Weapons
In addition to the station weapons, the crew carried their own
personal weapons, for use if they went down. These usually consisted
of a hand gun, of wide variety, and a rifle or submachine gun,
also of great variety. In the squadron armory, a modest selection
of guns was available. If the armory didn't have anything to tickle
your fancy, the black market gun market was easily accessible
and offered an amazing selection in plentiful quantities, and
the selection was exceeded only by the agreeable prices. Since
we didn't have to carry them or their ammunition any farther than
the helicopter, choices were made based on firepower and "style".
An aircraft was also typically armed with at least one M-79
grenade launcher, a shoulder fired weapon which broke down like
a shotgun for loading a 40 mm grenade. We carried the M-79 because
it could fire CS, an industrial strength tear gas which was helpful
in flushing reluctant VC out of undergrowth and bunkers and into
the open where we could shoot them. They didn't like to be in
the open when helicopters were around. Contrary to the movies,
VC caught in the open by helicopter gunships, even a large number
of VC, usually resulted in all the VC becoming dead or incapacitated
in a very short time, with little or no damage to the helicopter.
The M-79 was also useful as a hand weapon for defence until rescue
arrived, if we were downed. It could fire a shotgun round, an
illumination flare, and the standard grenade round as well as
the CS. We also carried "pop-flares" for illumination
at night. They were hand-fired by hitting the butt with the heel
of your hand. There was also a supply of smoke hand grenades for
marking targets and determining the winds. The M-79 rounds usually
were stowed under the copilot's seat, and the smoke grenades were
usually hung where they could be easily reached on the sheet-metal
wind deflectors (which had handy louver holes in them) riveted
to the door posts.
There was also added to this heavy load, "chicken Plates",
chest armor for the pilots, body armor and butt armor for the
gunners. The pilots sat in armored seats. The gunners sat on a
chicken plate over their ammo boxes. There was no other armor
protection for aircraft parts such as engine, transmission, or
tail rotor drive. Since the aircraft was single engine, the det
"never" went into combat except as a two aircraft fire
team. Two aircraft provided mutual covering fire support during
engagements.
An interesting side note from the Army. Rumor was that they
told the Navy that a door mounted mini-gun would not work, and
that the aircraft could not be made to absorb the recoil of a
fifty. It would tear the aircraft apart. They didn't arm their
Hueys with such weapons. At least I never saw any armed that way.
With the above armament, the outstanding accuracy, and the wide
field of fire provided by the door gunners, the riverine forces
said that they preferred the Seawolves to the more glamorous Army
Cobras.
The Army FACs were the best Army pilots available, or at least
among the bravest. They flew little L-19, high-winged Piper Cubs,
that could seat one passenger. They were as slow as we were, and
had no guns. They did, however, have two rocket pods under each
wing which they loaded with smoke rockets to mark targets. We
would work with them whenever they asked. They patrolled as we
did, the only visible Army presence in the realm of offensive
patrolling that we could see.
The normal drill with the FACs was for a FAC to spot some suspicious
activity somewhere, and call up the local Seawolf det for a strike.
We worked with them a lot because the other Army helos were so
slow and unresponsive to the discoveries of their FACs. They apparently
had bigger fish to fry and couldn't get to the scene before the
FACs were out of gas or before the situation had changed and the
opportunity to hit the enemy had passed. We were local and would
respond with a scramble.
When we arrived and joined the FAC, he would swoop down in his
piper cub L-19, and shoot a smoke rocket into the target area,
pulling up in a steep climbing turn seemingly right over the target.
He would go in much closer than we normally did, and was always
more accurate with his smoke than we were with our HE. We never
could figure out why the Army just didn't replace his smokes with
HE and let him do the job himself.
They held our respect without qualification, along with the
Army "Dustoff" helicopters. Dustoff was the common Army
callsign for Medevac helicopters. They flew "D" and
"H" model Hueys, stretch versions of the Hueys we were
flying. They were prominently emblazoned on the nose and on the
doors with large red crosses on white backgrounds, which were
to identify them as medical aircraft, protected from hostile fire
by the Geneva Convention. The Geneva Convention also prohibited
these helicopters from being armed, even for self-defence. In
Vietnam, the Geneva Convention markings seemed only to serve as
better aim points for the enemy, and the prohibition on guns only
prevented the Dustoffs from returning the hostile fire which was
frequently directed at them. The fat bullseyes and the lack of
guns never seemed to deter the Dustoffs from braving hostile fire
to evacuate the wounded. They went in regardless of the hostile
fire unless it was of such intensity that no helicopter could
be expected to survive it. Sometimes even that fire did not stop
them. They would go in where gunships feared to tread. We set
them apart, along with the FACs, from the rest of Army aviation
that we encountered in the Delta.
Copyright © 1997,1998, Tom Phillips
