9th Marines
12 May 1966
This article is dedicated to the brave men of the 9th
Marines and especially 1st Battalion 9th Marines whom
I served with (Cpl Robert L. Peragallo). Giving special honor
to 1st Squad "B" 1/9 who on May 12th of 1966 engaged
(at the cost of their lives) the R20 Doc Lap VC Battalion in
the village of Hoa Tay. The battle was part of the May Ky Lam
Campaign. On May 12th a 14 man patrol from Bravo Company under
the command of Capt. Norman E. Henry was engaged by a superior
force. The 14 man patrol from "B" Company had begun
a battle that would last three days and cost the lives of 12
of the original 14 man patrol plus the lives of two Marines
who were part of the original reaction force.
Capt. Henry upon realizing the gravity of the patrols circumstances
sent a 2nd squad to try and reinforce the then "lost Patrol".
I was a member of that 2nd squad. As the battle progressed Capt.
Henry's entire Bravo Company became engaged, it too came under
the overwhelming fire and mortar barrage of the R20 Battalion.
"A" and "D" companies were helilifted into
the battle which resulted in one helicopter being shot down
and one grounded while it was unloading Marines from "A"
company. No one is really sure how many Marines were killed
that day, but I do know that 12 from the original squad of Marines
who engaged the R20 were killed, two were killed from the reaction
squad which I was a member of. The Plt commander of 1st Plt
- a
2 Lt.Capel was also killed leading a charge to rescue the Lost
Patrol. We never counted those wounded that day, but one did
not have to go far to find a wounded Marine.
This report also honors those Marines from "A" and
"D" companies who paid the price that day for coming
to our aid in the battle we called 'The Lost Patrol" or
"Operation Bravo".
This After Action Report covers the April action of Operation
Georgia - The May Ky Lam Campaign and Operation Liberty.
This report is dedicated to those who died and
to us who survived.
The "Battling Bastards of Bloody Bravo"
Cpl Robert L. Peragallo (known as the "Wop")
USMC 1/9 "B" -1st Plt. 2nd squad - 0331
12th of May 1966 - Hoa Tay Vietnam
U.S. MARINES IN VIETNAM
AN EXPANDING WAR
1966
by
Jack Shulimson
HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
1982
CHAPTER 6
April Actions and Operation Georgia - The May Ky Lam Campaign
- Operation Liberty
April Action and Operation Georgia
The Spring political crisis caused a serious disruption of
Marine offensive operations at Da Nang. With the sudden arrival
of Vietnamese Marine battalions at the Da Nang Airbase in April,
the U.S. Marine regiments in Quang Nam Province suddenly found
themselves with a new mission. They not only had to fight a
war against the Communist, but also to prevent one between government
troops and the Struggle Forces. Colonel Simmons compared the
role of his regiment to that of the "ham in the sandwich,"
the filler to absorb the shock of the confrontation between
the two opposing sides.
This situation could only benefit the Communist. The 9th Marines
had to revert to the defensive because of the threat to the
security of Da Nang created by the polarization of the ARVN
forces into hostile factions. With the abandonment of several
government outpost along Route 4 and vast amounts of ammunition,
the VC not only rearmed at GVN expense, but reentered the area
the Marines had just cleared during Operation Kings.
* Colonel Nicholas J. Dennis, the commanding officer of the
3rd Engineer Battalion in early 1966, commented that he vividly
recalled "a request....for engineers to clear mines and
booby traps from one of the abandoned ARVN encampments on Route
4." He and his engineers came under a night attack from
the VC before the job was done and his engineers sustained four
casualties, including one man killed. Col Nicholas J. Dennis,
Comments on draft MS,n.d. (Jun 78) Vietnam Comment file.
On 16 April, an old enemy, the R-20 "Doc Lap" Battalion,
attacked one of the companies from Lieutenant Colonel Donahue's
2nd Battalion, 9th Marines in position north of the abandoned
39th Ranger outpost at Phung Thu. Company H, commanded by Captain
Everette S. Roane, had established defensive positions north
of Route 4, and put a squad ambush south of the road. Suddenly,
at 0400, the enemy opened up with recoilless rifle and mortar
fire. Simultaneously, the enemy launched two company-size assaults,
one from the southeast and the other from the southwest. The
attack from the southwest, about 100 men, ran into a Marine
ambush and stalled. According to the Marine squad leader, his
men "shot 12-15 VC for sure-most likely more." At
dawn the following morning, the squad found two enemy bodies
in front of its position.
The approximately 150-man force attacking from the southeast
reached the north side of Route 4, but was unable to penetrate
the Marine company's premeter. As soon as the attackers cossed
the road:
*The VC were like ducks in a shooting gallery. Many VC were
shot as they crossed the road and went down into the paddy in
front of the 2nd Platoon. At one point, 22 VC were shot as they
attempted to remove bodies. During the lulls in illumination,
as bodies would be removed and more VC would cross the road,
there would be more bodies.
Marine aerial observers arrived overhead and as Marine artillery
responded, the enemy's supporting mortars and recoilless rifles
fell silent. The VC ground assault dissipated, and the attacking
force broke up into small groups. Enemy probes continued along
the Marine company perimeter, but, "this most likely was
to cover the collection of VC casualties and the withdrawal
of the main force."
At first light, the Marines counted 12 enemy bodies, but estimated
killing another 63. Company H had not gone unscathed, suffering
seven dead and 37 wounded, largely as a result of the enemy's
recoilless rifle and mortar attack.
In mid-April the 9th Marines resumed the initiative, following
the temporary standoff of the political crisis. Originally,
the regiment planned to follow Kings with a one-battalion operation
begining on 10 April in the An Hoa region south of the Ky Lam
and Thu Bon. Thus, the Marines would carry out General Walt's
promise to Mr. Can, the An Hoa project leader, that III MAF
would protect the industrial complex there. Though unable to
meet the original date, the 9th Marines completed its revised
order for Operation Georgia by 14 April. The mission was assigned
to Lieutenant Colonel Taylor's 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines.
Click on any image to see a full sized JPG
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Le Thuc
Can, project leader of the An Hoa Industrial Complex
(center), discuss plans with Gen Walt and Lt.Col William
W. taylor (left), commanding Officer, 3rd Battalion,
9th Marines. The battalion is about to reenter
the An Hoa region in Operation Georgia |
Operation Georgia Area
April- May 1966
|
A 60 mm
mortar team from the 3rd Battalion, 9th Marines in Operation
Georgia has just fired off a round at a VC sniper. |
With the completion of the planning, the 9th Marines battalions
began preliminary preparations for the operation. On 18 April,
Lieutenant Colonel Kelley's 2nd battalion, 4th marines, which
had arrived at Da Nang three days earlier, relieved the 3rd
Battalion on the eastern flank of the 9th Marines area of operations.
Both Lieutenant Colonel Donahue's 2nd Battalion and Taylor's
3rd Battalion then reentered the former Kings area of operations
in conjunction with ARVN and Vietnamese militia forces. Their
assignment was not only to eradicate the VC but to determine
suitable LVT river-crossing sites and assembly and resupply
points for the forthcoming operations.
Although the operation had not officially begun, Lieutenant
Colonel Taylor established a forward base at the An Hoa airstrip
on 20 April. Helicopters from Mag-16 lifted the command group
and Company L from Marble Mountain while Air Force C-123s, as
in Operation Mallard, flew in an artillery battery, Battery
F, 12th Marines.
On the 21st, the designated date for the start of the operation,
the rear headquarters and two rifle companies, supported by
a platoon of LVTH's from Company B, 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion,
moved overland toward the objective area. A third company, Company
I, 9th Marines, arrived at An Hoa by helicopter and Air Force
transport brought in a second 105mm battery, Battery B, 12th
Marines. Both fixed-wing transports and helicopters continued
to fly in supplies for the An Hoa buildup. On 22 April, Company
L linked up with the LVT convoy after it had crossed the Thu
Bon River.
With the establishment of the An Hoa base, the battalion began
the second phase of the operation. Lieutenant Colonel taylor
had divided the An Hoa region into 20 well-defined company-sized
TAPRs and the Marines, with local ARVN and South Vietnamese
Popular Forces, began a series of actions, using tactics similar
to those used during Operation Kings. Combining Country Fair
and Golden Fleece techniques, the Marines attempted to secure
the hamlets surrounding the An Hoa base in order that the industrial
complex there could become a reality.
Despite intelligence reports indicating the presence of the
VC V-25 (5th VC) Battalion in the western sector of the Georgia
zone of action, that area between the Vu Gia and Thu Bon Rivers,
the Marines encountered little opposition through the end of
April, only harassing fire and mines. Marines aerial observers
and a platoon from the 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, supporting
the operation, accounted for most of the VC sightings at this
stage. Air observers and reconnaissance Marines "frequently
detected movement of small enemy forces at long range and directed
artillery fire at the VC with telling effect." Major Samuel
M. Morrow, commander of the provisional artillery group at An
Hoa, commented that although some:
"......very fine targets were observed and some excellent
missions.....fired, there was a tendency on the part of these
untrained observers {the reconnaissance Marines} to enter fire
for effect too early and attempt to "chase the target"
rather than reenter the adjustment phase....."
Yet the reconnaissance outpost on the southern and western fringes
of the Georgia operation area controlled 36 artillery missions
and six air strikes, resulting in at least 30 enemy dead. Lieutenant
Colonel Paul C. Trammell, who relieved Lieutenant Colonel Taylor
in early May as the commanding officer of the 3rd Battalion,
later recalled that although Major Morrow expressed his doubts
about the "effectiveness of the recon teams in fire adjustments,"
the artillery commander afterwards "conceded that the concept
worked well."
The heaviest action of Operation Georgia occurred on 3 May.
Captain George R. Griggs' Company M, 9th Marines, which had
just relieved another company during the operation, prepared
to cross the Thu Bon. Its objective was the hamlet of Phu Long
on the northern bank of the river in the north central sector
of the Georgia area. During the river crossing, an estimated
one-to-two-company enemy force, later identified as being from
the ubiquitous R-20 Battalion, opened fire on the Marine company
in LVTs. In a four-hour firefight lasting through the afternoon,
Griggs' company reinforced by two other Marine companies and
supported by air and artillery, finally secured Phu Long. LVTHs,
which accompanied the Marines in the river crossing, brought
direct fire upon the enemy positions and were "instrumental
in neutralizing enemy fire and preventing more casualties."
During the engagement, the Marines suffered five dead and 54
wounded They killed 15 of the VC and estimated that they had
inflicted another 100 casualties.
Although technically ending on 10 May, Georgia, like Kings before
it, was in reality an extension of the Marine area of operation.
Lieutenant Colonel Trammell held his command post and two rifle
companies, reinforced by an artillery battery from the 12th
Marines at the An Hoa base. The final reports of Georgia indicated
that a favorable kill ratio had been achieved, 103 confirmed
VC dead at a cost of nine Marines killed and 94 wounded.
Click on any image below to
view a full sized JPG.
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A Marine
appears to be watching over a pastoral scene during
Operation Georgia. Smoke however, can be seen rising
where Marines have destroyed a VC bunker. |
As Marines
from 3d Battalion watch, a VC suspect raises his hands
in surrender and comes out of his bunker. The Viet Cong
made effective use of bunkers, fighting holes, and underground
tunnels. |
Marines
from the 3d Battalion, 9th Marines engaged the VC in
a firefight during Operation Georgia. The Marine on
the left appears to be reaching for a clip to reload
his M14. |
The May Ky Lam Campaign (The Lost Patrol "B"
1/9)
Taking advantage of the truce in the political situation,
on 4 May, Colonel Simmons published a renewed offensive above
the Ky Lam River. The Ky Lam Campaign, named after the river,
was to be a three-phased advance "to clear the regimental
zone of action of organized resistance south to the line of
the Thu Bon-Ky Lam-Diem Binh-Cau Lau-Hoi An Rivers." At
the end of May, the forward battalions were to reach Phase Line
Brown, a line which extended from below Dai Loc in the west
and followed the La Tho-Thanh Quit Rivers eastward, with the
exception of a 2,000 meter-wide horseshoe-shaped salient extending
south 5,000 meters along both sides of Route 1 to just above
Dien Ban. In June, the regiment was to begin the second phase
of the operation, securing all of Route 4 west of Route 1 and
extending the Marines' lines down to the Ky Lam. During July,
the 9th Marines, in the final phase of the campaign, was to
advance southward in the region east of Route 1 and incorporate
the city of Hoi An in its area of responsibility.
The concept of operations for the offensive required the same
"scrubbing" tactics used in Kings and Georgia. Battalions
were "to deploy their companies in a diamond configuration,
terrain permitting, and to employ all supporting arms imaginatively
and vigorously." Colonel Simmons later explained that the
failure to use air and artillery in the past had resulted in
needless Marine casualties. He believed that the American command
had to take a realistic attitude toward civilian casualties.
The selective employment of supporting arms did not by itself
increase the number of civilians killed and wounded, but it
did cause the inhabitants of contested hamlets to abandon their
homes, thus becoming refugees. Simmons viewed the refugee from
his perspective as an asset, "a person who had made his
election physically to move over to our side." The removal
of refugees from the hamlets in the uncleared area made the
Marine task that much easier. The cost of housing, feeding these
refugees, and rebuilding their hamlets, if necessary, was considered
a minimal price to pay.
For the Ky Lam Campaign, Colonel Simmons had four infantry battalions
under his operational control. These were the 2d Battalion,
4th Marines and all three 9th Marines battalions, including
the 3d Battalion in An Hoa. Lieutenant Colonel William F. Doehler's
1st Battalion 9th Marines, which had been the Da Nang Base Defense
Battalion, became available for the campaign when relieved by
Lieutenant Colonel Dorsey's 3d Battalion, 3d Marines. Doehler's
battalion inherited Dorsey's responsibility for the 9th Marines
western sector.
The heaviest fighting in the early stages of the campaign was
in Doehler's zone of action. On 10 May, he had established the
battalion's forward command post in Dai Loc. His Company B,
commanded by Captain Norman E. Henry, was on the eastern bank
of the Vu Gia, 3,500 meters south of Dai Loc to provide a covering
force for units leaving the Georgia area od operations. That
morning, Company A, 9th Marines, which ahd been under the operational
control of the 3d Battalion during Operation Georgia, crossed
the Vu Gia in LVTs and rejoined its parent battalion at Dai
Loc. After the river crossing, Company A, prepared for a clearing
operation around the town of Dai Loc, which Henry's company
made preparations for a similar operation in southern Dai Loc
District above the Thu Bon. Allied intelligence sources indicated
that the R-20 Battalion had reinfiltrated this area. A report
received on 11 May stated that a company of the battalion was
in the hamlet of Do Nam near a small finger lake, 2,000 meters
northwest of Company B's position.
On the morning of 12 May, one of Henry's patrols unexpectedly
came upon the enemy. The 14-man patrol squad had left the company
CP at 0630, moving east. one hour later, the patrol reported
that it had come under small arms fire and captured a VC suspect.
Encountering no further resistance, the Marines continued their
patrol. At 0830, the squad leader radioed back that a water
buffalo was in its path. Captain Henry ordered the squad to
avoid the animal, but "if threatened by it, they were given
permission to shoot." In the squad's next report, about
30 minutes later, the Marines stated that they had wounded the
buffalo and were giving chase to finish it off. Fifteen minutes
after that, the patrol reported harassing fire and seeing Viet
Cong fleeing to the east "and that the patrol was giving
physical pursuit." The patrol leader asked for supporting
mortar fire. Company B's mortar section fired an 81mm ranging
round, but the patrol was unable to observe its impact. Captain
Henry ordered his mortars to cease firing, fearing that they
might hit his own men. About that time, the company sent out
a second squad to follow the route of the first patrol. The
second squad came under small arms and mortar fire itself. The
Marines countered with mortar fire from the companies base area
which silenced the enemy's weapons. About 1030, the squad leader
reported hearing a 'heavy volume of small arms fire, mortars,
M79s, and hand grenades due east of their position," near
the village of Do Nam. Believing that he had found the missing
Marines, he asked for an aerial observer.
Although no Marine observation aircraft was available, "an
Army AO {aerial observer} happened into the area and reported
an apparent firefight" in the vicinity of the avtion recently
reported by the second squad. The Army aircraft dropped a red
smoke grenade in the village of Do Nam and fired four rockets
into a trenchline in front of the Marines. Making another pass,
the Army AO threw out two messages to the Marines below, informing
them that there were 20 Vc in the trench line.
By this time, Captain Henry decided to move the rest of the
company to support his embattered Marines. By 1145 he had established
a 500-meter defensive line near the village of Hoa Tay, 500
meters southwest of the second squad's position. The company
commander then ordered the squad, which had suffered five heat
casualties, to pull back to the company lines. By 1230, the
entire company was heavily engaged. The company's 81mm and 60mm
mortars failed to silence the enemy's weapons and Henry asked
for artillery and air support. After an artillery mission fired
by the 2d Battalion, 12th Marines, the action died down for
about 20 minutes. At noon, the enemy opened up again with small
arms and mortars, but by this time F-4Bs from VMFA-542 were
overhead. The jets' first runs on the entrenched VC in Do Nam
once more temporarily silenced the enemy.
Following the air strikes, about 1320, Captain Henry's men spotted
two Marines crossing an open field toward their lines. Henry
ordered "a base of fire and mortar fire" to cover
the two men. Both Marines were from the first patrol and badly
wounded. The company commander asked them, before they went
under sedation, where the rest of the squad was. The men vaguely
pointed in a general direction to the northeast and said they
were all dead. Before being overrun, the wounded men claimed
that the patrol had killed 30 of the enemy.
Despite poor communication, Lieutenant Colonel Doehler had been
able to follow the course of the Company B action. Through "fragments
of information which had sifted through," the Marine battalion
commander believed that his company had encountered the R-20
Battalion. He had just received an intelligence report that
two companies of the R-20 had reinforced the enemy company already
in the area "to ambush Marine units operating in the area."Doehler
ironically remarked later that since Company B was heavily engaged
at the time, "it was considered to be accurate if not timely
report."
Shortly after 1330, the 1st Battalion commander decided to reinforce
his Company B. After some initial problems in obtaining helicopter
support, he moved Company D and a platoon from Company A to
link up with Henry's company. By 1815, the three Marine units
were consolidated in a 360-degree defensive perimeter around
the hamlet of Hoa Tay.
By this time, Marine air and artillery had broken the back
of enemy resistance. F-4Bs, F-8s, and A-4s from VMFA-542, VMF
(AW)-235, and VMA-214, respectively, joined UH-1E gunships from
VMO-2 in 27 close air support missions. Nine air strikes were
run at half-hour intervals. Marine artillery had fired 242 supporting
rounds. The combination of air and artillery apparently inflicted
heavy casualties on the VC. According to Doehler, the supporting
arms disorganized the enemy, forcing them to break up into small
groups. Later interrogation of the villagers revealed that these
small bands of VC had slipped back across the Thu Bon during
the night of 12 May. They had forced civilians in the hamlets
to carry their dead and wounded.
On the morning of 13 May, Lieutenant Colonel Doehler moved
his CP into Hoa Tay and prepared to conduct a two-company search
and clear operation. That afternoon Company B recovered the
bodies of the 12 missing Marines near the western tip of the
small finger lake. For the next two days the battalion carried
out a series of cordons and searches in the area of southern
Dai Loc District containing the hamlets of Hoa Tay, Hoa Nam,
and Giao Thuy 2 and 3.
This entire sector contained a series of heavily fortified hamlets
interspersed among large, open fields. Lieutenant Colonel Doehler
described the village defenses as formidable, observing:
A complex network of trenches surrounded each of the villages.
In many cases, communication trenches extended from village
to village. These trenches typically were four to six feet deep
with firing positions located every few meters. At the bottom
of the trenches, tunnels were dug back into the ground to provide
overhead cover.... In some places bamboo-lined bunkers were
found, some of which were underground and some above ground.
In the day's fighting, the battalion killed 53 enemy and possibly
another 83, but suffered 12 dead and 31 wounded.
Colonel Simmons observed that all of the regiments's contacts
during May resulted from VC initiative. The enemy would begin
the action when the Marines were at a disadvantage, either because
of numbers or terrain, and in some cases because of both. The
Marines, neverless, eventually attained the upper hand. For
the entire month, the 9th Marines killed more than 270 of the
enemy; 75 Marines died, 328 were wounded. Over 50 percent of
the Marines casualties in May were caused by enemy mines and
explosive devices, many of them made from equipment abandoned
by the ARVN forces south of Da Nang.
* Colonel George W. Carrington, Jr. , who during this period was the 3d Marine Division G-2, recalled, ". . . they told
Bill Doehler to confirm body counts . . . he reolied there is
not a damn, single {enemy} body out here. We had to pause for
about three full days in counting bodies, in order to allow
the totals to catch up with what {was} already reported."
Col George w. Carrington, Jr. , Comments on draft MS, dtd 15
May 78 (Vietnam Comment File).
Colonel Simmons remarked upon the considerable increase of enemy
incidents during the month, declaring that this upsurge was
largely due to "the increase freedom of movement enjoyed
by the Viet Cong in many outlying ateas as the result of diminished
GVN military activities during the periods of political instability....."
As a result, the regimental failed to reach Phase Line Brown
on 31 May and the Ky Lam Campaign was behind schedule.
 |
 |
Marines of the 1st
Battalion, 9th Marines sit in a captured Viet Cong barracks
and training site in Dai Loc District south of Da Nang.
The site is near where the Marine lost patrol was overrun. |
Map of Operation Liberty with boundries June 1966
|
Operation Liberty
With the surrender of the struggle Forces at Da Nang and the
restoration of some stability there, the 9th Marines once more
renewed its offensive, coordinated with the South Vietnamese.
On 2 June, Colonel Lap, who had replaced Colonel Yeu as the
Quang Da Special commander, visited Colonel Simmons at his CP.
The South Vietnamese commander wanted the 9th Marines to resume
Country Fair operations in the five-village pacification area.
He assured Simmons that at least one battalion from the 51st
ARVN Regiment would be committed to the pacification campaign.
following Lap's visit, Colonel Simmons revised portions of his
previous orders. On 5 June, he ordered his battalions to renew
County Fair operations with the Vietnamese and extended the
deadline for the attainment of Phase Line Brown from 31 May
to 20 June.
At this juncture, General Kyle decided to transform the 9th
Marines Ky Lam Campaign into a division-size offensive, involving
"a conventional linear type attack of all forward units
to push the front lines forward in a deliberate search of every
hamlet in the zone. . . . " He divided the Da Nang TAOR
into three sectors: the cleared, the semicleared, and the uncleared.
The cleared, area formed an irregular arc around Da Nang Air
Base, delineated by the South China Sea to the east, the Cau
Do to the south, the foothills to the west, and the Cu De River
to the north. Extending the arc outward from the cleared area
boundary, the semicleared sector reached the Thanh Quit River
to the south, three to five kilometers into the high ground
to the west and the Hai Van Pass to the north. The uncleared
region consisted of the area between the La Tho-Thanh Quit Rivers
and the banks of the ky Lam-Thu Bon. Phase Line Green, the final
phase line, paralleled the latter two rivers. The 3d Marine
Division commander ordered that only minimum forces be held
in the rear and set 30 June as the target date for reaching
Phase Line Green.
Continuing arrival of marine reinforcements allowed General
Kyle to make this all-out effort. On 28 May, the 1st MP Battalion
arrived at Da Nang from the United States and relieved the 3d
Battalion, 3d Marines of its airfield security mission. The
3d Battalion then returned to the operational control of its
parent regiment, taking over the 3d Marines western TAOR. Colonel
Harold A. Hayes, Jr. , who had relieved Colonel fisher on 16
April as 3d Marines commander, at last had command of all three
of his battalions Other reinforcements were scheduled to arrive
at Da Nang, or were already in place. Colonel Bryan B. Mitchell
was slated to transfer his 1st Marines Headquarters from Chu
Lai to Da Nang in June. In fact, two of his battalions had already
moved by the end of May. The 3d Battalion, 1st Marines arrived
at Da Nang on 22 May while the 1st Battalion arrived on 31 May.
Both battalions were temporarily placed under operational control
of the 9th Marines. The 3d Battalion became the regimental reserve;
the 1st Battalion relieved the regiment's eastern flank battalion,
the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines, which rejoined its parent regiment
at Phu Bai.
By mid-June General Kyle could expect to have three Marine infantry
regiments consisting of eight battalion at Da Nang. He planned
to reduce the extensive 9th Marines TAOR by assigning the 1st
Marines to the eastern flank while the 3d Marines took over
that part of the 9th Marines TAOR west of the Yen River. In
effect, Kyle visualized a shoulder-to-shoulder advance to the
Ky Lam. The operation, codenamed Liberty, was scheduled to begin
on 7 June, with the 9th Marines bearing the brunt of the campaign
in its initial stages.
Colonel Simmons divided his TOAR into company-sized objective
areas. His reserve battalion, the 3d Battalion, 1st Marines,
was to concentrate on combined operations with ARVN and Vietnamese
local forces in the five-village pacification region in the
semicleared area. The 3d Battalion, 9th Marines was to continue
its two-company holding action in the An Hoa region. All the
remaining infantry companies were assigned tot he three forward
battalions, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines on the eastern flank,
the 2d Battalion 9th Marines in the center, and the 1st Battalion
9th Marines on the western flank. Thus each forward battalion
was to consist of five infantry companies instead of the usual
four, with three companies deployed tot he front and two to
the rear. The advancing battalions were to secure Route 4 by
20 June and reach the Ky Lam by the end of the month.
Lieutenant Colonel Van D. Bell, Jr's 1st Battalion, 1st Marines,
on the division's left, had its heaviest engagement just before
Operation Liberty started. During the evening of 5 June, the
battalion commander and his small mobile command group, embarked
in three *Ontos,
found themselves stalled on the northern fringes of Phong Ho,
a hamlet 10,000 meters south of the Marble Mountain Air Facility
and in an area "noted for their hostility toward ARVN soldiers
and their allies." Bell's vehicle had run out of gas and
the group had just been resupplied by helicopter. As the aircraft
took off for the return trip to Marble Mountain, VC weapons
from positions approximately 1,000 meters to the southwest opened
fire. Using his command group with its *Ontos as a blocking
unit, Lieutenant Colonel Bell ordered reinforcements from his
Company B, supported by LVTs and tanks, brought up from the
south of Phong Ho. According to the battalion commander, "the
result was a sound thrashing of the VC" with 11 dead enemy
left on the battlefield and a number of captured weapons. Bell
remembered several years afterward, "This area was never
pacified and later was leveled, and the villagers removed and
relocated."
*The Ontos was a full-tracked, light armoured, mobile carried
mounting six 106mm recoilless rifles, four .50 caliber spotting
rifles, and one .30 caliber machine gun. It had a crew of three
and was the primary weapon of the antitank battalion.
On 7 June Operation Liberty began with heavy preparatory artillery
fires. Marine artillery neutralized 35 objective areas in front
of the advancing infantry. Initially, the enemy countered the
Marine offensive with only small arms fire and mines. The mines
were the more deadly of the two. The most significant mine incident
occurred on 11 June in the 9th Marines central sector. Captain
Carl A. Reckewell's Company F, 2d Battalion, 9th Marines walked
into a large minefield in a grassy plot just south of the La
Tho River. Two detonations killed three Marines and wounded
21. While the wounded were being evacuated, four to five additional
explosions occurred and the grass caught fire, but fortunately
there were no further Marine casualties. The following day,
the artillery fired a destruction mission which caused seven
secondary explosions in that same field.
On 15 June, the division completed its planned realignment of
regiments in the TAOR. Colonel Mitchell assumed operational
control of his two 1st Marines battalion and took over responsibility
for the division's eastern flank from the 9th Marines. With
a corresponding reduction in the western sector, the 9th Marines'
TOAR now consisted of only 134 square miles, the regiment having
given away nearly 100 square miles in the exchange.
With the adjustment of forces and sectors, the 3d Marine Division
continued its "scrubbing" actions in Operation Liberty.
The only serious enemy opposition occurred in the 9th Marines
zone of action. On 18 June, Company C, 9th Marines, operating
2,000 meters south of Dai Loc, came under heavy mortar and small
arms fire, suffering eight wounded. The company asked for supporting
air and artillery which ended the enemy resistance. Lieutenant
Colonel Donahue's 2d Battalion, 9th Marines underwent a similar
attack on 22 June in the hamlet of La Hoa, immediately east
of the railroad and 4,000 meters north of the Ky Lam. Marines
once more called upon supporting arms, including naval gunfire
from the destroyer USS Marton (DD 948), to silence the enemy.
According to U.S. Navy historians, "Between four and nine
ships including destroyers, cruisers, and rocket ships were
available for gunfire support in Vietnam at any one time and
more than half the missions supported Marines in I Corps."
NHD, Comments on draft MS, dtd 19June78 (Vietnam Comment file).
By the end of the month, all three Marine regiments reached
Phase Line Green and the operation ended. VC resistance to the
Marines advance had been scattered and ineffective. The 9th
Marines observed that the lack of major enemy resistance gave
plausibility to the thesis that the momentum of Operation Liberty
prevented them from gaining any degree of initiative and uprooted
them "from what had been a relatively secure operating
area." That regiment alone claimed to have recovered 40
square miles from the VC. The Marines were once more optimistic
about pacifying the extensive Da Nang enclave.
