This article is intended to provide an overview of Australian
military operations in Vietnam, commencing from the deployment
of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam in 1962 until 1969,
when Australian forces began withdrawing, consistent with the
Nixon Doctrine of phased withdrawal from the mainland of Asia
and the policy of Vietnamization.
Australian Army Training Team Vietnam
initial commitment to supporting the American stance in Vietnam
consisted of the deployment of a team of military advisers. On
26th July, 1962, the Minister for Defence announced Australia's
intention to send 30 instructors to the Republic of Vietnam, 4
going to the Military Aid Council Vietnam (MACV) Headquarters
in Saigon, 22 to regional locations in the Hue area and 4 to Duc
My.(1) This team would be headed by Colonel F.P. Serong, previously
the Commanding Officer at the Jungle Training Centre, Canungra,
Queensland and would fall under the command of the Australian
Army Forces, Far Eastern Landing Forces Headquarters in Singapore.(2)
The AATTV arrived in the Republic of Viet Nam in August, 1962.
AATTV advisers served with ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam)
units, including infantry, artillery and armoured divisions, independent
regiments in the I Corps area (the northern province of RVN),regional
and provincial headquarters, the Viet Nam Police Field Force,
US Special Forces, Montegnard Special Forces and CIA operations.(3)
with the escalation of Australian forces in Vietnam in 1966, Australian
advisers also served with 1 Australian Task Force (1ATF) at Nui
The primary role of the AATTV was to train ARVN and other forces
in the use of weapons, jungle warfare, tactics and strategy. In
addition, especially after the Australian government allowed them
to serve in battalion and smaller size formations, they took liaison
roles, calling for airstrikes and arranging logistical support
and medevac facilities.(4) They usually operated as individuals
or in small groups of two or three. After 1963, the AATTV came
wider the operational control of MACV HQ in Saigon.
It was intended that the AATTV would represent Australia's commitment
to the American operations in Vietnam, and as such, would not
have a significant military impact, however, the success of Australian
advisers, not the least Captain Peterson's training of the Montegnard
Special Forces in Dar Lac Province, became quickly known throughout
Vietnam. Peterson established Armed Propaganda and Intelligence
Teams (APIT)from amongst Montegnard tribesmen in Ban Me Thout,
designed to disseminate propaganda, collect information and establish
a network of informers, disrupt Viet Cong infiltration and supply
routes, conduct small scale raids, ambushes and similar minor
operations and to conduct long range patrols into Viet Cong 'safe
areas', rescuing captured Montegnards and liberating equipment
and ammunition.(5) Building on these gains, Peterson established
a 'People's Army' just prior to his departure, which at that stage
had effectively regained control over much of southern Dar Lac.
Despite the inadequacies of the ARVN forces in protecting pacified
areas, and the racial problems between Montegnards and ARVN personnel,
Peterson had succeeded in regaining the upper hand in the Ban
Me Thout region.
AATTV techniques and method of operations were significantly
different to many of those employed by their American allies.
Experience in the jungles of Malaya and Borneo and limitations
on the number of and facilities available to personnel had combined
to produce very different tactics. Whilst American instructors
expounded the virtues of the rapid deployment of large numbers
of troops, massive fire power and decisive battles, Australians
concentrated on individual marksmanship, the independence of platoons
from battalion HQs, small scale patrols and ambushes. These differences
frequently bought Australian advisers into conflict with their
American superiors. The Australian policy of 'economy of effort'
was directly opposed to the American idea of 'concentration of
The AATTV served with distinction in Vietnam. During AATTV's
tour of duty, members were awarded four Victoria Crosses , several
Military Crosses and several Military Medals.(7) It was the first
Australian force to arrive and the last to leave. After the initial
deployment of 30 instructors, it was increased in size by 30 in
May 64, by 23 in June 64 and then by 17 in January 65, bringing
it to a total strength of 100. It was restricted from further
increases by the introduction of a National Service Act ( 1965)
in Australia which required large numbers of instructors. The
last instructors were withdrawn from Phuoc Tuy Province in December
The First Deployment of Australian Ground Forces
April 1965, consistent with President Johnson's deployment of
US Marines to protect airforce bases in Vietnam, Prime Minister
Robert Menzies announced his intention to send 1 Battalion, Royal
Australian Regiment (1 RAR) to assist in the defence of American
bases. 1 RAR was restructured into a tropic warfare organisation,
similar to that employed by the American army and was to serve
under the US 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate) (US 173 Abn Bde)defending
Bien Hoa airforce base.(8) Initially it was intended that 1 RAR
would only be used in defence of the base but by December offensive
operations had begun in conjunction with 173 Abn Bde.(9) During
1 RAR's tour of duty, 22 major operations were conducted, usually
within 10- 20 miles from Bien Hoa.
Like the AATTV, significant problems were encountered in operating
with US forces. These were compounded by poor equipment, including
WWll Owen machine guns and boots, and no decent preparation before
embarkation.(10) The operational problems they encountered will
be discussed below, suffice to say here that they were not sufficiently
resolved until 1 ATF was established with its relative independence.
Despite these limitations, however, the Australian regiment was
successfully integrated into the 173rd Abn Bde until it's tour
of duty was completed in June 1966.
1 Australian Task Force, Phuoc Tuy Province
In March 1966, the Australian government announced its intention
to create a single and relatively independent Australian Task
Force. This came largely as a result of political pressure on
the Australian government by Washington but was also consistent
with the dominant foreign and defence policy trends within Canberra
at the time. However, there was good reason to create the Task
Force from a military point of view also. Not only would Australians
regain some control over their troops, they would also b e permitted
to conduct operations in a manner consistent with their experiences
and techniques. Consideration was also given to the limited resources
available to the Australian command in Vietnam and the need to
pool these in order to have a more visible effect.
Phuoc Tuy Province was situated in III Corps Tactical Zone and
had a population of 160,000. At the time the Australian Task Force
arrived, it was a relatively wealthy province, agriculturally
rich and had a comparatively prosperous costal economy.(11) It
had been a base for anti- French activities after WWII and was
familiar with the Viet Minh presence that accompanied these activities.
Despite having two large Catholic migrant towns, it was also a
popular base for Viet Cong activities throughout the peri od of
Diem's authority.(12) Operational in Phuoc Tuy were the 274th
and 275th NLF Regiments and D445 Provincial Mobile Battalion,
a local force with strong links to the population, an intimate
knowledge of the area and assured supplies.(13) Phuoc Tuy was
chosen because there was a reasonable amount of enemy activity,
no risk of border violations in the pursuit of the enemy and it
had excellent air and sea access ensuring adequate supplies and
an assured evacuation route. The terrain was not dissimilar from
that often encountered by Australians in Malaya and Borneo.(14)
In addition to this, the pacification of Phuoc Tuy was essential
to the Republic of Viet Nam because of it's wealth and to the
MACV because of the significance of Vung Tau port and the supply
line (Route 15) to Saigon and Bien Hoa.
The exact placement of the Task Force was to be Nui Dat, a hill
on Route 2, heading north through the centre of the province,
and was an obvious challenge to the NLF and NVA forces in the
area. The Logistics and Supply Group (1 ALSG) was to be situated
in Vung Tau where it had good access to American supply groups
and where it was hoped that it would be somewhat safer from large
The Task Force was to be comprised of 2 infantry battalions (5/6
RAR were the first to serve in 1ATF), artillery (including some
New Zealand elements), engineers, signals and administrative support,
under the command of Brigadier O.D.Jackson. 1 ALSG, situated in
Vung Tau, consisted of 176 Air Dispatch Company, 2 Field Ambulance,
33 Dental Unit, 2 Composite Ordnance Depot and the 101 Field Workshop
of Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers.(16) Since
August 1964, No.35 Transport Squadron R AAF had been situated
at Vung Tau and one year after the arrival of 1 ALSG, (June 1966)
No.9 Helicopter Squadron was also situated in Phuoc Tuy.(17)
1 ATF's objectives in Phuoc Tuy were never very clear. Because
it came under the operational command of US II Field Forces Vietnam
(II FFV) but under the National command of Headquarters Australian
Forces Vietnam, the Commander 1 ATF had to reconcile sometimes
inconsistent objectives. Westmoreland told Jackson to "take
over Phuoc Tuy" (18) this representing the sum of operational
commands to 1 ATF whilst from COMAFV, directions were only a little
more specific. The aims of 1 ATF were defined as the security
and domination of 1 ATF's assigned area, the security of Route
15, the conduct of other operations as required, conduct operations
anywhere in II Corps Tactical Zone and in Bin Thuan Province,
II Corps Tactical Zone, as required and agreed up on by COMAFV.(19)
The actual practicality of these aims was hard to assess but it
seems that this meant 1 ATF was to act in both a pacification
role as well as a large unit to counter main force activity. COIN
operations would require frequent contact and close coordination
with ARVN forces and the civilian administration, yet the advisory
positions in ARVN and the administration were dominated by Americans.
Alternatively, large scale operations against main force units
required more manpower, mobility and fire support and could not
adequately be completed by two battalions, one of which would
be required for base security at all times.(20)
This obscurity when it came to the nature of operations 1 ATF
was to engage in did provide the Commander with some degree of
operational freedom. It was not long before the Australian forces
had applied their own style of operation. The base at Nui Dat,
whilst its presence was readily felt in the area, was not cleared
as were American bases and few ARVN personnel and no indigenous
Vietnamese were allowed in to the base. This meant that troop
strength at any one time was hard to gauge and security was excellent.(21)
It was D Company of 6 RAR that first encountered the enemy in
strength at Long Tan on the 18th August, 1966. In engaging and
severely damaging D445 Regiment, 1 ATF had established a moral
and later physical victory over the NLF in Phuoc Tuy. The TET
offe nsive of February 1968 also contributed to the relative demise
of the VC 5th Division (274 and 275 Regiments) in the region,
due to the heavy casualties they took. In order to combat the
decreasing strengths of the pre-existing NLF forces in the province
D440 was created in 1967, however, this too proved relatively
ineffective, not being a local force so much as comprising large
numbers of NVA personnel.(22)
In November 1967, 1 ATF was increased in size by an extra battalion
(including of NZ artillery) and was reinforced by a squadron of
Centurion tanks. This was largely in response to the deteriorating
military situation in Vietnam and the possibility of a TET offensive.
General Vincent(COMAFV, Jan. 67 to Jan. 68.) was enthusiastic
to increase Australian forces either to enable them to take responsibility
for all of Phuoc Tuy or alternatively to allow 1 ATF to operate
more tangibly outside Phuoc Tuy Provinc e.(23) As a result, in
January 1968, 1 ATF was ordered to occupy an area 12 km north
of Bien Hoa airforce base with a view to preventing any expected
TET assault. 1 ATF successfully engaged and defeated the enemy
in February (as it did an offensive in Baria at the same time)
and returned to Nui Dat. It was again called on to help defend
Bien Hoa in May.(24)
If Vincent was enthusiastic about Australia's role in the war,
then McDonald, his successor, was passionate. McDonald was keen
not to see Australian operations limited to "[saving] the
odd house from being burned to the ground" in Phuoc Tuy.
In gaining U S support for operations against the VC in the Long
Hai Hills in March 1968, McDonald believed the US was attempting
to hasten Australia's victory over the enemy in Phuoc Tuy so as
to get 1 ATF operational in areas of more strategic importance.(25)
By 1969 and the beginning of the US withdrawal from South Vietnam,
II FFV had re-prioritized its aims and instructed the then COMAEV,
General Hay, that 1 ATF should do likewise. First priority was
to be given to pacification, second to upgrading ARVN for ces
and thirdly to military operations. Pacification operations began
in May 1969 however, hampered by unenthusiastic ARVN forces, they
proceeded slowly. The success of the ATF in forcing the withdrawal
of NLF mainforce units and the provincial battalions (the remnants
of D445 and the newer but understrength D440) was countered by
the maintenance of the VC infrastructure in the villages.(26)
Thus, as the Task Force withdrew in December 1971, the remaining
AATTV members presided over the gradual return of NLF in Phuoc
The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and Royal Australian
Air Force (RAAF) in Vietnam
As part of the policy of encouraging American involvement in Vietnam,
and as a result of his convincing victory at the polls in November
1966, Menzies decided to increase Australia's military commitment
to Vietnam to include elements of all three service s. The commissioning
of two Charles F. Adams guided missile destroyers in 1965 and
the impending replacement of Canberra bombers by F-111s had made
available to COMAFV additional sources for Australian expansion
Since August 1964, elements of No.35 Squadron (Transport) consisting
of fixed wing Caribous, had been stationed at Vung Tau in order
to assist in the movement and supply of 1 RAR. With the establishment
of 1ATF and 1 ALSG in June 1966, No.9 Squadron (Helicopters) were
deployed to provide logistic support, troop movement and medevac
facilities for the Task Force. Both of these commitments were
relatively insignificant except in so far as they represent a
desire to have Australians supporting Australians in Phuoc Tuy.
Both units served as essential support for 1 ATF but added little
to the ongoing American involvement.
Perhaps one of the most significant RAAF contributions to the
Vietnam war was the deployment of No.2 Squadron (Canberra Bombers)
to Phan Rang in April 1967. The Australian 5th Airfield Construction
Squadron had completed the provision of Australian facil ities
by the time the first eight of ten bombers arrived. The bombers
were to under go usual maintenance in Phan Rang but had additional
facilities at Butterworth, in Malaysia for major maintenance.(28)
The entire contingent consisted of approximately 300 men and came
under the command of USAF 35th Tactical Fighter Wing.(29)
At the height of Australia's military involvement in Vietnam,
RAAF personnel numbered around 800 people from three squadrons.
The Canberra Bomber squadron was the first summoned home in March
1971 followed by the remaining RAAF personnel in August.
The Royal Australian Navy's contingent to the Vietnam war was
somewhat more substantial. The first RAN personnel to see action
were the six members of Clearance Diving Team 3 . CDT 3 was initially
part of the Inshore Undersea Warfare Group 1, based at Ca m Ranh
Bay but itself was assigned to Vung Tau from February 1967. It
was largely responsible for assisting in harbour defence, Explosive
Ordnance Disposal (EOD), harbour patrols and port command and
communications during Operation Stabledoor (1967-1970). (30) In
addition to these responsibilities, CDT 3 was called on to conduct
marine salvage operations, especially where EOD might be called
for, river clearing in preparation for riverine military operations
and recovery of enemy ammunition.
The largest RAN contribution however was supplied by the deployment
of Australian destroyers to Vietnam. The destroyers came under
the command of COMNAVFORV, primarily operating with the US Seventh
meet and in March 1967, HMAS Hobart, was the first to see action.(31)
HMA Ships Hobart and Perth alternated sixth month deployments
until March 1969 when Australia's newest DDG, HMAS Brisbane arrived.
Brisbane was replaced by Vendetta, a Daring Class Destroyer which
was in turn replaced by Perth and Hobart respectively before completing
RAN participation in the Vietnam conflict.(32)
Hobart, being the first RAN vessel to arrive in Vietnam under
combat conditions, participated in Operation Rolling Thunder's
maritime equivalent, Operation Sea Dragon. This was designed primarily
to intercept Water Borne Logistic Craft (WBLC) and bomb military
and logistic targets north of the DMZ. Sea Dragon was suspended
in November 1968 during Perth's second deployment. After this,
RAN vessels' primary task was to provide Naval Gunfire Support
(NGFS) for ground operations near the coast.
Whilst the threat of naval or air assault on Australian vessels
was not very large (33), as was the threat of sea borne mines.
However, during inshore operations against WBLCs and in support
of amphibious assaults, the ships were somewhat exposed to ground
fire. In September 1967 Perth was hit by fire from a shore battery
whilst in the pursuit of WBLC. Australian vessels were also used
in conjunction with 1 ATF in Phuoc Tuy. In May 1970 Hobart relieved
USS St Paul and provided NGFS for Australian troops in the Long
The Royal Australian Navy also played a considerable role in
the deployment of Australian troops and supply to 1 ATF and RAN
vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin. Primary amongst these was HMAS
Sydney, an aircraft carrier converted into a troop transport.
1 RAR was despatched aboard HMAS Sydney from Sydney to Vung Tau
in May 1965. HMA Ships Jeparit and Boonaroo acted as supply ships
for Australian forces in Vietnam and were particularly important
in supplying HMAS Vendetta with ammunition during its deployment.
Other aspects of RAN involvement in Vietnam included the dispatch
of 8 pilots and support staff for retraining and posting with
US 135th Aviation Company at Vung Tau in October 1967. The RAN
Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV) was used for troop insertion
and as gunships for support fire. The RAN also provided pilots
as part of a detachment to No.9 Squadron RAAF at Nui Dat, operating
in cooperation with 1 ATF.(36)
The Royal Australian Navy personnel in Vietnam totalled 2800.
As far as possible RAN forces were directed to operate in cooperation
with 1 ATF in Phuoc Tuy Province, consistent with the concept
of having an Australian sphere of influence. Whilst operational
command was reserved for COMNAVFORV, the degree of integration
with Australian forces was maintained until the last RAN vessel,
HMAS Sydney departed from Vung Tau in February 1972.
Assessment of Australian Military, Operations
AATTV: Quite obviously if the general method of operations practiced
by Australian forces was significantly different to those employed
by US forces, then so to would be the training techniques. The
AATTV, in instructing Vietnamese officers, often found themselves
contradicting or being contradicted by US advisers. In addition
to this, such was the social status acquired by being an officer
in ARVN that Junior officers were discouraged from humiliating
their seniors by learning more than they. Particularly if one
trained junior officer was expected to serve under an untrained
(by AATTV or others) senior officer.(37) AATTV advisers serving
with Montegnard units found that ethnic rivalry between Montegnards
and the Vietnamese often resulted in 'no shoot' a greements being
made with the NLF and VC forces entering Vietnam via Laos or Cambodia.
Peterson's Montegnard Special Forces at one stage in 1964 even
rebelled, marching on ARVN forces in Ban Me Thout.(38)
AATTV operations under COMMACV were quite successful. There were
few problems in the actual command system, save that their were
disagreements over methodology when it came to instruction. AATTV's
only real problems came from working with the ARVN forces , whom
they frequently found to be unenthusiastic, lazy and often corrupt.
1 RAR and US 173rd Abn Bde: There were again general differences
of opinion between these two units as to the conduct of operations.
The Airborne Brigade was designed for large deployments and heavy
firepower whereas 1 RAR, even though restructured to suit the
American style, with its COIN experience in Malaya operating individually
from larger units was unfamiliar and uncomfortable with these
type of tactics.(39) One such example of this was 1 RAR's training
with helicopters. In Malaya, up to 4 helicopters, primarily for
medevac purposes, was all a company could expect or need. There
was no requirement for the calling of air strikes and little for
artillery strikes. Yet at Bien Hoa, the latter of these two were
frequently practiced, due to the number of enemy being engaged,
and up to 40 helicopters were effectively at the disposal of the
battalion.(40) Unlike subsequent Australian forces, there was
little association with ARVN forces and no reliance on them.
Australian Task Force: 1ATF met with mixed successes during its
five years in Phuoc Tuy. Initially, 5 & 6 RAR encountered
large scale opposition and attempted to combat NLF political structure.
Given the limitations under which 1 ATF worked (poor equipment,
ambiguous objectives and unfamiliar combat environment), it could
be asserted that it was quite successful in doing this.(41) Long
Tan and the subsequent follow up missions severely damaged NLF
main force units in the region, however, it is was apparent that
the relative speed with which the NLF reasserted itself in the
years of ATF's withdrawal indicates the failure to win the hearts
and minds of the people, a tactic essential to the defeat of communist
terrorists in Malaya and Borneo.
The increase in size of 1 ATF in November 1967 introduced new
problems and new challenges to the Australians. From January,
1 ATF operated in engagements outside of Phuoc Tuy. These were
again large scale operations and required some degree of integratio
n with American forces. Similar problems to those experienced
by 1 RAR in 1965 were encountered, somewhat lessened in effect
by the larger size of 1 ATF (two battalions were distributed through
three bases; Balmoral, Coogee and Coral) and its increased independence
from ll FFV HQ. The defence of Bien Hoa during the TET offensive
in February 1968 was successful in so far as 1 ATF maintained
a relatively high enemy body count and weren't themselves overrun.
However, the nature of the war was such that victories in large
scale battle counted for little. It was hoped that 1 ATF could
secure a credible victory in Phuoc Tuy, one similar in nature
to Australia's military experience in Malaya, where the enemy
was totally wiped out, the people supportive of the Australian
presence and the province safe from subversion. an effect, a lasting
and significant impact on the province, culminating in the battle
of Binh Ba in June 1969. 1 ATF returned to Phuoc Tuy, after several
redeployments to Bien Hoa, and engaged in the third phase of their
operations, the pacification of Phuoc Tuy.(42)
This phase, from about mid-1969 to 1971, met with mixed success
also. Although carrying out operations which Australian troops
were more familiar with, the degree of success encountered was
somewhat less than expected. The reasons for this relative failure
include not only the ineptitude of ARVN forces, cooperation with
whom was essential in maintaining an allied presence in any given
area, but also several rather glaring deficiencies in Australian
planning. An ambitious project by Vincent in 1867 to cr eate a
minefield barrier from Dat Do to Phuoc Hai, described by Westmoreland
as "imaginative", had resulted in a substantial number
of casualties (almost thirty) in operations in the Long Hai hills
in May 1969 and again by 8 RAR in January 1970.(43) Whil st it
may have been the responsibility of ARVN forces to patrol the
minefield, it was apparent that Vincent was remiss in expecting
them to do so. In addition to this, Larsen identifies one major
deficiency in the Australian civil aid program, claiming t hat
lack of coordination with local administration often resulted
in poor planning and inadequate maintenance of completed projects.(44)
Quite clearly the major reason for the failure of 1 ATF to complete
a total victory in Phuoc Tuy was the lack of cooperation between
ARVN and 1 ATF and the failure of the civil aid program to win
the support of the populace away from the NLF. Australia's attempts
to train and equip RVN local units and their reluctance to allow
these units any significant participation in the pacification
program, coupled with the failure of these local units to perform
adequately, destined Phuoc Tuy to be returned to the influence
of the NLF on the ATF's withdrawal.
The Nixon (Guam) Doctrine announced in July 1969 and the British
decision to quit East Of Suez by 1971 led to a radical rethinking
of Australian defence and foreign policy in Southeast Asia. Consistent
with the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam, Australia
also withdrew, the last Australian troops to leave being the AATTV.
The defeat of the Liberal-Country Party coalition government coincided
with this final withdrawal. Australia had spent ten years actively
involved in the conflict in Vietnam, sending almost 47 000 men,
almost 500 of whom were killed and about 2 400 wounded. Australia
paid its own way through Vietnam, employed its own tactical methods,
adopted its own province and pursued its own political ends. Australian's
were noted to have h ated everybody, the truth of which may lay
under a mixture of racial prejudice and discontent at the limitations
they were placed under compared to the excesses of their American
1) p.8, Australia's Military Committment to Vietnam, Paper tabled
in accordance with the Prime Minister's Statement in the House
of Representatives on 13 May 1975.
2) p.1, Horner, D.M., Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam
War, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.40, Strategic
and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1986.
3) p.38, McNeill, I., "Australian Army Advisers: Perceptions
of Enemies and Allies", in Maddox, K., &, Wright, B.,
(eds), War: Australia and Vietnam, Harper & Row, Sydney, 1987.
4) p.39, Ibid.
5) pp.35-36, McNeill, I., "Peterson and the Montegnards:
An Episode in the Vietnam War", Journal of the Australian
War Memorial, Oct.1982, No.1.
6) pp.56-58, McNeill, I., "Australian Army Advisers: Perceptions
of Enemies and Allies".
7) p.311, McNamara, E.G., "Australian Military Operations
in Vietnam", Journal of the Royal Institute for Defence Studies,
Nov.1968, Vol.113, No.652,.
8) p.30, Breen, R.J., "Problems of an Expeditionary Force
- First Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, 1965",
Defence Force Journal, Sept/Oct.1986, No.25.
9) p.44, McNeill, I., "An Outline of Australian Military
Involvement in Vietnam: July 1962-December 1972", Australian
Defence Force Journal, Sept/Oct. 1986, No.1.
10) pp.30-32, Breen, R.J., op.cit.
11) p.312, McNamara, E.G., op.cit.
12) pp.60-61, Frost, F., "Australia's War in Vietnam: 1962-1972",
in King, P., (ed), Australia's Vietnam: Australia in the Second
Indo-China War, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983.
13) p.62, Ibid.,
14) p.45, McNeill, I., "An Outline of Australian Military
Involvement in Vietnam: July 1962-December 1972".
15) p.313, McNamara, E.G., "Australian Military Operations
16) p.61, Brodie, S., Tilting at Dominoes: Australia and the
Vietnam War, Child & Assoc., Brookvale, 1987.
17) p.17, Fairfax, D., Navy in Vietnam: A Record of the Royal
Australian Navy in the Vietnam War 1965-1972, AGPS, Canberra,
18) p.7, McAuley, L., The Battle of Long Tan, the legend of ANZAC
upheld, Hutchinson, Hawthorn, 1986.
19) p.15, Horner, D.M., Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam
20) pp.64-65, Frost, F., "Australia's War in Vietnam: 1962-1972".
21) p.9, McAuley, L., The Battle of Long Tan, the legend of ANZAC
22) p.314, McNamara, E.G., op.cit.
23) pp.31-32, Horner, D.M., op.cit.
24) p.314, McNamara, E.G., op.cit.
25) pp.34-35, Horner, D.M., op.cit.
26) p.50, McNeill, I., "An Outline of Australian Military
Involvement in Vietnam: July 1962-December 1972".
27) p.96, Larsen, R.L., &, Collins, J.L., Allied Participation
in Vietnam, Dept. of the Army, Washington D.C., 1975.
28) p.97-98, ibid.
29) pp.17-18, Fairfax, D., Navy in Vietnam: A Record of the Royal
Australian Navy in the Vietnam War 1965-1972.
30) pp103-105, ibid.,
31) pp.97-98, Larson, et.al, op.cit.
32) Fairfax, D., Navy in Vietnam: A Record of the Royal Australian
Navy in the Vietnam War 1965-1972.
33) Perhaps with the exception of air assault from USAF jets,
Hobart was struck by three missiles in June 1968, killing two
and wounding several. The fighters also attacked two patrol craft,
34) pp.59-61, 85, Ibid.
35) pp.170-173, Vendetta used British ammunition which had to
be shipped from Sydney.
36) p.99, Larsen, et.al., op.cit.
37) pp.43-47, McNeill, I., "Australian Army Advisers: Perceptions
of Enemies and Allies".
38) pp.37-40, McNeill, I., "Peterson and the Montegnards:
An Episode in the Vietnam War".
39) pp.34-35, Breen, R.J., "Problems of an Expeditionary
Force - First Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, 1965".
40) p.312, McNamara, E.G., op.cit.
41) pp.65-66, Frost, F., "Australia's War in Vietnam: 1962-1972".
42) pp.66-67, ibid.
43) pp.41-42, Horner, D.M., op.cit.
44) p.113, Larsen, et.al, op.cit.,
Australia's Military Commitment to Vietnam, Paper tabled in accordance
with the Prime Minister's statement in the House of Representatives
on May 13, 1975.
Breen, Maj. R.J., "Problems of an Expeditionary Force - First
Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment in 1965", Defence
Force Journal, (Sept./Oct., 1980), No.60.
Brodie, S., Tilting at Dominoes: Australia and the Vietnam War,
Child and Associates, Brookvale, 1987.
Fairfax, D., The Navy in Vietnam: A Record of the RAN in the
Vietnam War. 1965-72, Australian Government Printing Service,
Canberra, 1980. Frost, F., "AustraIia's War in Vietnam: 1962-72
", in P. King (ed.), Australia's Vietnam: Australia in the
Second Indo-China War. George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1983.
Horner, D.M., Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War. Canberra
Papers on Strategy and Defence No.40., Strategic and Defence Studies
Centre, Australian National University, 1986.
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